

Academia and the Politics of Nature

On 13th March, 2007 a lawsuit was opened against Dr. Atilla Yayla, then professor at Gazi University in Ankara. Yayla was charged with “Insult of the Turkish nation” (Art. 301 of the Turkish Criminal Code) and with “Insult of the memory of the state founder Mustafa Kemal Pasha (law no. 5816). In a conference organized by the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) Yayla was alleged to have said that the one-party system once established by Atatürk could not be called progressive. He was convicted in trial court and received a suspended 15 month jail sentence, which he is currently appealing. Today Prof. Yayla lives in voluntary exile in Great Britain.

In Israel historian Benny Morris, who had underpinned the Palestinian perspective on the refugee problem, at first found no appointment. Since he was appointed at the university of Be'er Sheva he justifies the evictions in the course of Israel's 1947/8 war of independence and reserves this right even for the future. Ilan Pappé, another so called ‘new historian’, remains, according to several of my interview partners a “*persona non grata*” in Israel. In a book published in 2006 he labels the evictions of Palestinians 1947/8 as “ethnic cleansing.” Ilan Pappé teaches at the University of Exeter in Great Britain.

On 1st July 2008 a hearing took place at the Indian Supreme Court regarding a plea of the political psychologist Ashis Nandy of the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies in New Delhi. Nandy was asking for protection against arrest or detention by the Gujarat Police because he feared that a first information report registered against him at the Satellite Police Station in Ahmedabad in May 2008 would enable the Gujarat Police to arrest him whenever he travelled out of Delhi, especially to a State ruled by the Bharatiya Janata Party or its allies. The Indian Supreme Court Bench expressed its anguish at the growing intolerance over free expression of one's views.

These three examples taken from Turkey, Israel and India, give a glimpse into the interesting and sometimes problematic relationship between the sphere of academia and the sphere of politics. They illustrate two things:

1. the tendency of academics to assert their independence and
2. the tendency of the state to co-opt academics as a source for its legitimacy, as a justification for its policies or for other opportunistic reasons.

The academic has the potential to withdraw his/her legitimacy support from the state. This is what Attila Yayla has done with the Turkish state. Apparently the Turkish state to a large extent derives its legitimacy from its founding father Atatürk and not so much from open, democratic debate. In fact it fears such debate because of well known deficiencies in its democratic culture and institutions, which are only slowly getting ameliorated in view of a possible accession to the EU.

The Israeli state, in contrast, does not depend on forged accounts of its history for its legitimacy. It draws its legitimacy from a functioning democratic process in which all citizens, including Israeli Arabs, can participate. For some of its citizens, however, an additional source of legitimacy lies in Israel's founding myth that portrays the 1947/8 war and the subsequent displacement of Palestinians as a struggle unilaterally forced upon the nascent state by the Arab nations. They do not want to acknowledge that some of the Jewish settlers, who were not prepared to share their land with their Arab country men, thereby contributed to the escalation of the conflict. The failure of many of the early Zionists to accept that they are not entering an uninhabited land but that they have to come to terms with a long established Arab population is one of those things deliberately forgotten by parts of the Israeli public. So called 'new historians' like Ilan Pappé and the early Benny Morris who call(ed) for a more balanced view of history and thereby come into conflict with the denials of this founding myth would not easily be awarded with a chair at an Israeli university.

The Indian state and judiciary, in turn, protect an independent scholar like Ashis Nandy who was frank enough to touch upon the suppressed truths regarding one of its federal member states. The Gujarati government and even parts of the judiciary in that state seem to stand firmly by their implications in the 2002 violence and previous state sponsored riots. Nandy would probably find it difficult if he were to seek a university position in a state run institution in Gujarat. Luckily he is not seeking one there.

The three examples show the possibilities as well as the limits of independent scholarship in matters that touch upon or are relevant to the legitimacy ideology of the state. Lucky those, who have the privilege of working under the auspices of a state that has no history of violence and subsequent denial of it and is therefore not in need of keeping academics in check.

Turkey is far from it. Israel, apart from certain sensitive topics, has a remarkably open political culture and democratic institutions that include its Arab minority (a certain amount of discrimination notwithstanding). And India as a whole, of course, imposes hardly any limitations on academic freedom whatsoever. Thus naturally the question of the autonomy of the academic is a function of the relative justice or injustice of the legitimacy ideology and the constitutional and legal framework based on it. Only a just society can afford to be open and democratic. Regimes lacking legitimacy in the eyes of their citizens can't. And of course regimes and societies that ask the question of legitimacy only after having gotten rid of all potential opponents will suffer from collective denial complexes that will not permit them to lead open debates on certain sensitive topics.

The examples illustrate how academia and politics stand in a complex relation of relative mutual dependency and respective autonomy. The state provides academics with resources and it has the power to withdraw them. Academics, in turn, furnish the regime with legitimacy which also they can withhold. Normally, however, both sides mutually enhance their prestige by interacting in close cooperation.

This cooperation has been studied extensively by Stanford sociologist John W. Meyer and his collaborators. In the following I shall briefly give an overview over his thinking. Meyer observes that often the rules legitimizing the polity are represented by scholars as if they were laws of nature. I am calling this 'the politics of nature'. The reference to nature creates an overlap between the realm of science and the realm of politics. If the rules governing society are based on laws of nature then politics is bound by them. Thus by way of representing certain legal, social, economical or historical phenomena as governed by laws of nature, the world of academia takes precedence over the world of politics.

Politics or the state in turn receive a mandate to act in a certain way. Certain policies can be represented as necessary because they are in congruence with some alleged laws of nature. In this way, modernity has been represented as a 'natural' process and so has been 'capitalism', 'colonialism' and 'globalisation'. Whatever is represented as if it were a natural process, has to be taken into account by state and politics, but it can not be the object of human agency. After all, politics as human agency can not change the laws of nature. Meyer and his team have pointed out that what is presented as natural, universal and unchanging is often cultural, contingent and subject to historical change. Meyer has shown that the modern state, its institutions and actors follow patterns available at a global cultural level that has emerged from somewhere at some point of history and is therefore culturally and historically contingent.

As against such a mystification of historical processes as natural processes, Meyer derives the global efficacy of the modern condition from an historical process that started in Europe and that was globalised in the period of the European colonial expansion and subsequent decolonisation. Another important sociologist, Shmuel Eisenstadt, calls the emerging global condition of modernity a 'civilization of modernity'. Both, Eisenstadt and Meyer, show that erstwhile European models like that of the nation-state, exercise a world-wide influence on the organization of polities with quite different cultural roots. The result is a multitude of modernities. Eisenstadt speaks of 'multiple modernities'.

Both argue against a Eurocentric interpretation of modernity as a 'natural' development model that all societies will eventually follow as if they were embryos following a genetic development pattern. They show that the European model is only one among many. It may have been the earliest but its adaptation in the non-European world used completely different cultural reagents and arrived at their own particular results.

Institutions and what constitutes actors and actions are constructs in that they are part of the social imaginary, which means that they are not natural and unchangeable. But neither can they be changed at will by any single person or group of actors since they owe their force to their general acceptance in the society. For the most part they are so much taken for granted that a considerable hermeneutic effort is needed to gain an awareness of their operation in the background. This would be the task of a reverse cultural anthropology that studies our own world from the vantage point of a 'different' cultural frame of reference. Here the historical perspective is very helpful and Meyer often refers to the European Middle Ages as such a vantage point. History offers one way of stepping out of the seemingly natural to realise its collectively imaginary character.

When Meyer takes Institutions, actors and actions as social constructs he opposes rational choice theories that take individuals and their self-interest almost as givens of human nature. Rational choice theories may offer an adequate description of some aspects of the human condition in modern societies but they miss out on the contingent character of modernity itself. We can easily think of societies governed by very different paradigms. In pre-modern or non-modern societies actions of individuals are typically dictated by the role the society provides for them. They are not simply based on their rational self-interest since in such societies, even the definition of what is in the best interest of the individual is governed by tradition and its guardians such as patriarchs, families, clans, casts, ethnic or religious groups.

While pre-modern or non-modern cultural reference frames tend to take the social structure as basic that ascribes roles to each individual according to age, gender, family, profession, cast, class, tribe, or religion. The modern cultural reference frame, in contrast,

takes the individual as basic. All other institutions like marriage, family, association or state are construed as based on the free consent of individuals engaged in them. It is by reference to the individual that the roles of these collective institutions are defined and not the other way around. It is no longer the collective that defines the role of the individual. Instead, every collective is gauged by reference to the benefit that it gives to the individuals that partake in it.

These benefits, Meyer reminds us, are expressed in terms of justice and progress in the modern cultural reference frame. If a collective does not stand the test of justice, it needs to prove at least that it progresses in the way justice prescribes. If it proves to be stagnating or even regressing, it loses its legitimacy. Progress in the way of justice is normally translated into expansion of equal liberties for all individuals. The normative individualism underlying the modern reference frame is reflected even in the way we understand, for example, the economy as the result of individual decisions regarding investment, consumption, or choice of profession. Accordingly, the political system is construed as the result of individual citizens' decisions in elections and party memberships. Religion and culture are construed as based on individual choices regarding beliefs and values.

What holds true at the normative level does not always hold true at the empirical level. We may perceive ourselves as modern, autonomous individuals. But the fact that only our modern semiotic frame of reference legitimises us to do so, and contingently so, usually escapes our attention. The fact, that it does escape our attention itself is reassuring, for it proves how much we take for granted the institution of the individual as an autonomous agent, which in itself is an expression of its stability. But this does not prevent the social scientist from gaining an awareness of the fact that the hegemony of this modern semiotic framework is based on a choice, which is implicit in the self-understanding of the modern individual. When the modern individual thinks that because of its autonomy it has the right to choose its consort, its profession, its domicile etc., it normally understands this autonomy as a natural fact. For the social scientist, however, this

autonomy is grounded – not in nature – but in culture, i.e. in society and its institutions, and these in turn rest on implicit choices made by a majority of individuals all the time, but unconsciously for the most part.

Philosophers like John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas have explicated and interpreted the normative aspects that are implicit in the modern cultural reference frame. Sociologists like Eisenstadt and Meyer have traced their factual impact the world over. This impact is not equally strong everywhere and in all spheres of world society. An important notion in Meyer's theorising about modern principles pervading world society is therefore that of 'decoupling'. He and his team have demonstrated how in many instances norms and patterns available at the level of the global cultural reference frame have been adopted formally by local actors. But their impact on the ground is often minimal. Actors like states and organisations gain legitimacy as agents from a formal adherence to modern principles such as human rights for example, but they do not always put them into practice. Sometimes the formal adherence to such principles only serves to cover up the continuation of older or alternative ways.

Meyer speaks of the global cultural reference frame as offering patterns of institution building, that is patterns of rationalisation that structure every day life along standardised, impersonal rules. In the modern framework, these rules orient the social order towards collective goals like justice or progress. The rules are typically represented as universal laws. Sets of rules like human rights or the patterns governing economic growth are represented as if they were laws of nature holding true at all times and in all places.

The reference to nature in these debates is a heritage from the enlightenment period when philosophers spoke of 'natural' reason and 'natural' rights as being the same for every human being irrespective of his/her social status, estate, or station in life, or the society s/he lives in. Enlightenment philosophers in turn drew from the natural law tradition of the Middle Ages which in turn drew from Antiquity. For the Greek and the Romans what was natural was also morally sound. For the age of enlightenment the refer-

ence to nature was an emancipatory lever against the traditional social order that was represented as morally corrupt, inhuman and therefore unnatural.

With the rise of science and technology and the new wealth created by industrialisation, reference to nature and its inherent rationality became more and more convincing. Thus scientific methods taken from natural science were carried over to social and cultural phenomena that became modelled after natural phenomena. Positivism and social Darwinism are examples for such attempts. Today, the flaws of these schools of thought have been exposed and the 'naturalness' of reason is considered with more modesty. Consequently, ideas such as human rights have a harder time to retain their quasi-natural and therefore uncontroversial character. More often nowadays, universal human rights are parochialised as Western in essence and Asian, African, or Islamic alternatives are conjured up as 'authentic' responses from non-Western cultures.

The genealogy of modernity is Western, as Meyer argues. To understand this process all the stages are important: the medieval concentration of all authority in one 'High God', the corresponding supra-national authority of the church, the enlightenment notion of the absent God, the increasing independence of the rationalities of politics, religion, morality, and science, corresponding to the growingly autonomous spheres of state, religion, culture and nature. Often this process has been described as following an inner necessity, as if modernisation and secularisation was an evolutionary process governed by laws of nature.

This, according to Meyer, may have been a necessary myth for modern man to believe in, in order for modernity to unfold. It is a myth nevertheless as more recent critiques of modernisation theory have revealed. The actual path that societies take when they adopt the semiotic reference frame of modernity in one of its variants diverges greatly and is contingent upon the altercations between modernity and tradition in their respective contexts. Paths to modernity (and away from it) may thus vary.

One of the main sources of legitimacy for actors in the modern reference frame is science and its particular rationality. This includes, first and foremost, a methodological

scepticism with regard to all non-observable entities or forces like ancestral spirits, demons, angels, devils, Gods, and esoteric forces like zodiac constellations, crystals, chakras, witchcraft etc. Social systems like science thus exert an eminent influence on the cultural reference frame and, through the models it has to offer, on individual actors like nation states, organisations and individuals. Experts advise individual actors as to who they are, which goals they should pursue and which means they have to employ to achieve them. All these experts appeal to theories that are taken to be globally applicable, if not universally valid. Moreover, as a system that is not an actor but operates as a source of legitimacy, science exempts its innovators to bear the costs and the risks of innovation. While science can freely alter the cultural reference frame to which actors have to refer, it is the actors who bare the economic burden of change and the consequences for failure.

Scientific rationality not only influences the cultural basis for individual and state actors. It also furnishes the modern cultural reference frame with things to be taken as real. The ontology of the reference frame has evolved to include formerly unknown things such as childhood, youth, or the self as an object of scientific observation. The acceptance of each of these as natural phenomena has consequences on the normative level, i.e. in law and family policies, but also in health care and education. The self is thought of as being complex, structured, capable of illness, reification, or alienation. It is taken as the unmistakable expression of the person, the residue of its authenticity, dignity, conscience and abilities. It is made the true sovereign and the yardstick of everything social. Knowing one's self, thereby, is a prerequisite for every modern individual. The self is in need of cultivation and the individual needs to ensure its inner consistency and the coherence of its actions, sayings, and beliefs.

Since law, politics, and every social institution is justified, ultimately, with reference to the many selves that form society, the individual selves have to be placed in a position where they can bring to bear their responsibility for the whole of society. To fulfil this role, the modern self needs to be brought up, educated, prepared, authorised, and cap-

able of checking and balancing itself. The self, therefore, becomes a task unto itself. The modern actor-individual can be thought of as sovereign, i.e. as source of legitimacy and agent in one, which is just another way of expressing the modern idea of the autonomous, responsible individual. As a source of legitimacy unto itself, the sovereign individual has a share in shaping the norms governing society whose legitimacy ultimately rest on the consent of all individuals taken together. As an agent, in turn, the modern individual is bound and legitimised by these very norms. Since the responsibility for the norms governing society ultimately rests on all individuals taken together, and that includes the justice of its institutions, for the fairness and efficiency of government, for the damage caused by progress to non-actors like plants, animals, children, handicapped, future generations etc., every individual can also claim to act on behalf of all of these instances. These instances, the state, its government, the environment, future generations, thereby become intermediate sources of legitimacy for the individual and a service to its own coherence, consistency, and share in collective sovereignty.

The civic and ethic responsibility of the sovereign self and its personal interests, private needs and secret desires may at times conflict. This conflict has found its reflection, as Meyer and his collaborators note, in the classical dualisms of psychology, i.e. the 'super-ego' and the 'id' of Freudian psychology and the 'me' and 'I' in George Herbert Mead's. The 'ego', the 'self' or 'personal identity' is the result of the dialectical mediation between the claims of society represented to the self through the generalised other, i.e. the 'super-ego' or the 'me'. This mediation is never perfect, as Axel Honneth following Mead has pointed out, since individual claims to self-expression always exceed the recognised patterns of conduct available through the cultural reference frame. The result is a struggle for recognition where new patterns are fought for and where the range of available models is consequently expanded.

A similar process of dialectical mediation between externally available models and internal raw interests is repeated in collective actors such as organisations and states when they form their collective identities or 'selves' as institutions. As institutionalised

sources of legitimacy, as collective ‘super-egos’, as it were, academics play a central role in such processes of dialectical mediation. Their authority derives not from their strength as actors but from their ability to assimilate and develop the rationalised and universalistic knowledge that makes action and actorhood possible. This authority is organized in academic institutions and fora. As disciplines they are devoted to specific bodies of knowledge and their dissemination, their ultimate aims include the broad development of society. According to Meyer, their rationalized knowledge structure constitute the ‘religion’ of the modern world, replacing in good measure the older religions.

Models of national development have their roots in scientific and legal knowledge but also the diffusion among states is heavily mediated by scientists and professionals. Meyer and his collaborators argue that rationalized modernity is a universalistic and successful form of the earlier Western religious and post-religious system. The new ‘religious elites’, as it were, are the researchers and scientists who write secularized and unconditionally universalistic versions of salvific history. Statesmen, legislators and policymakers deriving their legitimacy from it pursue this modern version of salvific history and implement it relentlessly. The sweeping success of neo-liberal ideology since the Reagan and Thatcher era and the subsequent financial crisis that we are experiencing now is probably a good example to illustrate this point.

So much for John Meyer and his theory of world society. In the remaining part of my talk I would like to go into some concrete examples of how within the realm of academia scholars struggle about the legitimate use of the terms ‘natural’ or ‘nature’ in connection with social, cultural and economic phenomena. The examples I would like to go into are the long standing controversies in Germany over value judgements in the social sciences beginning with the controversy on methods (Methodenstreit) in the 1890ies, continuing with the controversy on value judgements (Werturteilsstreit) in Berlin in 1909 and resurfacing as the controversy on positivism (Positivismusstreit) in Tübingen in 1961. Today this discourse has found an institutional form in the shape of

various centres for ethics in the sciences and humanities like the one in Tübingen where I did my PhD under the guidance of Axel Honneth.

The controversy on methodology in the social sciences emerged with the establishment of sociology in Germany. It had proponents of a scientific methodological ideal (methodological monism) facing proponents of a methodological dualism. The first held that natural sciences and social sciences should follow one and the same methodology. The social sciences, according to the latter, in contrast, would have their own scientific logic. In this controversy the postulate of the possibility of value neutrality in social sciences played a crucial role. Some years later this became the subject of the famous controversy of value judgement (Werturteilsstreit).

Max Weber formulated the basic position of methodological dualism with the introduction of the notion of understanding (hermeneutics) in sociology. He defined sociology as a science which strives to understand social action and its consequences through a methodology of hermeneutic interpretation. Social action, according to Weber, is characterised by the fact that actors attribute subjective meaning to their actions. However, hermeneutic sociology transcends the subjectivity of meaning by trying to grasp the semiotic reference frame in which actions and their subjective meanings are embedded. Understanding, according to Weber, is the reconstruction of the intended meaning methodically guided by the construction of ideal types. The hermeneutic approach thus accommodates the fact that the object of social science has intentionality. In this respect it is different from causal explanation in the natural sciences.

The representatives of methodological monism on the other hand tried to guarantee the scholarliness of the newly emerging discipline by adopting the methodology that had been developed in the natural sciences. They postulate the validity of the same methods of causal explanation, quantification, mathematical treatment of data, verification, falsification etc. for all disciplines that claim scholarliness.

The controversy continued in 1909 with the controversy about value judgements (Werturteilsstreit). The disputed question was whether the social sciences could make norm-

actively binding statements about policies or whether political actions could be scientifically justified. The main contestants were Max Weber, Werner Sombart and Gustav Schmoller. The younger scientists, Max Weber and Werner Sombart, defended the point of view that science by itself could lead to no value judgement. Research must consequently be separated from value considerations at all times. They were opposed by the so called 'lectern socialists' for whom science also included the right or even the obligation to comment on questions of social justice. 'Lectern socialists' was actually a polemic term denoting people like Gustav Schmoller who was no socialist at all. Much in the line of Bismarck's social legislation, Schmoller considered redistribution of wealth as the only way to prevent revolution.

Schmoller pleaded for science to be kept free of value judgement. To him it would be a misjudgement of the nature of ethical postulates like justice or equality to attempt to use them on a par with empirical truths from which to derive correct policies. To Schmoller ethical principles stand outside the realm of the empirical. They represent regulative ideas that can only provide broad direction. Weber maintained that it could never be the task of empirical science to deliver binding norms and ideals for practical or policy purposes. This would not only be practically impossible but even self-defeating. But even if values could not be a result of empiric science, they can nevertheless form legitimate research subjects. Given a certain value-based political purpose, science can judge the appropriateness of the means to achieve it, point out consequences of the applied means, check the inner consistency of purposes and reveal tacitly underlying ultimate ends. But also, otherwise, values play an important role in science: Already the choice of the research subject is based on values, namely on the 'research interest' that the researcher brings to bear on his subject. Weber, like Schmoller, claims that the validity of values is not scientifically demonstrable. Otherwise he sees values intervening in multiple ways in the work of the scientist.

The logical division between means and values boils down to a functional division of roles that a person can take up. To find the means appropriate to a purpose, a scientist

can be of use. The decision about the purposes, on the other hand, belongs to the realm of politics. Weber did not take the view that scientists should keep away from politics. He himself was engaged in the political controversies of his time. But the scientist cannot represent his political views in the capacity of a scientist. The moment he issues a value judgement he changes his role and becomes a citizen.

Empirical science can transform statements into other statements but not statements into imperatives. According to Weber this is a structural limitation of empirical science. The attempt to find out values with scientific means is not simply another view of the social role of the scientist, but is dubious methodically.

Even Rudolf Goldscheid, adversary to Sombart and Weber in the debate, insisted on a strict division between value considerations and empirical science. Since value presuppositions, however, were tacitly underlying any approach to economics, for example, he advocated a 'normative economy' in which value presuppositions should be made explicit from the start. In Weber's second contribution that concluded the debate he pointed out that he had maintained this latter proposition already for quite some time. He rejected, however, the rest of Goldscheid's deliberations about the problem of values.

The debate known as positivism controversy (*Positivismusstreit*) is sometimes called the second controversy about value judgements. It took place during the 1960s between the representatives of Critical Theory and those of Critical Rationalism. The prelude of the controversy was formed by a lecture of Karl Popper and a follow-up paper by Theodor W. Adorno on the opening day of a workshop of the German Society for Sociology which took place from the 19th to the 21st October, 1961 in Tübingen. In the ensuing controversy between Adorno and Popper there was a consensus about the fact that social-scientific theory inevitably contains value judgements. Only Hans Albert and Jürgen Habermas argued about whether at least at the level of elementary observation sentences, a representation free of value judgements would be possible.

In the main thesis of his lecture Popper postulates the unity of methods of natural and social sciences. Both consist in trying out solutions for their problems, not however like

naturalism or scientism in collecting observation data free of value presuppositions and then inductively building theory on it. The critical part of Critical Rationalism consists in the attempt to disprove the suggested solution through ‘falsification’.

For the representatives of the Frankfurt school, in contrast, the analysis of society proceeds from the fundamental idea of ‘totality’. ‘Totality’ is seen as a fundamental structural nexus which determines the character of the social; the psychosocial agencies like family, authorities, mass media etc. of the society form and determine thinking and identity of the individual from the start to a far greater degree as in the reverse. That is the individual could never have a similar effect on these social agencies. Sociology should uncover this totality and analyse it to create the preconditions for their potential overcoming.

In all of these controversies the politics of nature becomes never explicit. Implicitly, however, the controversy is about just that: Can academia by pretending that social phenomena follow the same laws as natural phenomena claim a piece from the realm of politics for itself? Interestingly those who are most interested in changing society, like the people from the Frankfurt School, deny themselves this possibility. They would for the most part maintain that we can’t derive value judgements from empirical analysis. But also we can’t do empirical science without presupposing value judgements. The suggestion thus remains to lead two discourses, one as citizen-philosophers on value propositions and one as social scientists or historians about the various social theories and historiographies we can generate based on different value presuppositions.

Ironically the adversary party who is least ready to lead a discourse on values and politics is implicitly doing just that by not explicating their value presuppositions. Instead these are hidden in a social theory or history that presents itself as part of natural history.

International Workshop

Historical Knowledge as Scientific Expertise in Contemporary Issues

Venue:

Jawaharlal Nehru Institute of Advanced Study (JNIAS), Conference Room (1st floor)

Time:

Friday, 28 August 2009; 10 am – 6 pm

Programme:

10 am	Welcome	Prof. Dr. Aditya Mukherjee Director, JNIAS
	Opening Remarks	Prof. Dr. Bipan Chandra, Emeritus Professor, JNU and Chairman NBT
10:20 am	Opening Lecture: Can there be a public approach to social processes without history? Some reflections on French contemporary experience.	Prof. Dr. Jean Boutier École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales Marseille, France Presently Fellow, JNIAS
	Chair:	Professor Balveer Arora, Professor, Centre for Political Studies and former Rector, JNU
11: 20 am	TEA / COFFEE	
11:30 am	Academia and the Politics of Nature	Dr. Michael Dusche Berlin, Germany Presently Fellow, JNIAS
	Chair:	Prof. Dr. Shri Prakash Centre for Contemporary Studies, JMI
12:30 pm	Whitening History: Revision, Reaction and Race in the Post-State-Socialist Politics of History in Hungary	Prof. Dr. József Böröcz Rutgers University, New Jersey, USA Presently Fellow, JNIAS
	Chair:	Dr. Sucheta Mahajan, Prof. for Social Theory Centre for Historical Studies, JNU
1:30 pm	LUNCH	
2:30 pm	From Boundary Marking to Nation Building: Changing Contexts of the History of Sciences	Prof. Dr. Dhruv Raina Chairperson, Zakir Husain Centre, JNU

	Chair:	Prof. Dr. Deepak Kumar, ZHCES, JNU
3:30 pm	A Psychohistorical Insight into Past and Present Romania Chair:	Prof. Dr. Ștefan Borbély Babeș-Bolyai University Cluj-Napoca, Romania, Presently Fellow, JNIAS Dr. Rakesh Batabyal, Dy Director, ASC
4:30 pm	TEA / COFFEE	
4:45 pm	Challenges for History Writing Under Modern Conditions Chair	Prof. Dr. Salil Misra Indira Gandhi Open University New Delhi, India Prof. Dr. Aditya Mukherjee Director, JNIAS
5:45	Concluding Remarks	Prof. Dr. Aditya Mukherjee Director, JNIAS
6 pm	WORKSHOP END	